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The Westray Mine Disaster and its Aftermath: 
The Politics of Causation* 
Eric Tucker 
Osgoode Hall Law School 
York University 
Abstract - Causation analysis is densely political in at least three ways. First, 
because- causation is crucial to our system of attributing moral, legal and 
political responsibility, causation arguments are advanced for purely 
instrumental purposes. They do political work. Second, because any particular 
occurrence is the outcome of an almost infinite number of antecedent events, 
"but for" causation analysis produces trivial results. A judgement about causal 
significance is required and will depend, in part, on the goals of the analysis. 
The choice of goals is political, but unstated goals and hidden assumptions often 
exclude consideration of some possible causes as significant. These politics of 
causation need to be made explicit. Third, the institutional setting in which 
official determinations of causation are made influence the outcome. Hence, it is 
necessary to explore these as well. Each of these three dimensions of the politics 
of causation is explored through an analysis of the 1992 Westray mine disaster 
which killed 29 miners in Nova Scotia, and the official responses to it. It is 
argued that if the goal is to protect workers and nothing else, then the political-
economic context that promotes the creation of hazardous conditions must be 
considered a significant cause of harmful occurrences. It is unlikely, however, 
that any of the official responses to the disaster will take this approach. 
Resume- La thiorie de la causalite est largement influence par des dimensions 
politiques et ce, a trois egards. Premierement, etant donne qu 'e/le est au centre 
de notre systeme d'attribution morale, Lega/e et politique de responsabilite, /es 
arguments issus de /'analyse de la relation de cause a effet ne servent qu'a des 
fins instrumentales. Ils font le travail politique. Deuxiemement, tout phenomene 
erant l'aboutissement d'une infinite d'evenements precurseurs, la thiorie de la 
causalite ne fournit que des reponses futiles. Une critique de cette theorie est 
necessaire mais est tributaire, en partie, des buts de /'analyse. Le choix des 
* An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the Atlantic Canada Studies 
Conference, X, Re-constructing History in Atlantic Canada. University of New 
Brunswick, Fredericton, May 5-7, 1994. I would like to thank my colleagues Judy 
Fudge and Harry Glasbeek for their numerous comments and suggestions. The 
article deals with developments up to April 10, 1995. 
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objectifs est de nature poLitique. Cependant, Les objectifs non avoues et Les 
hypotheses impLicites tendent souvent a exclure certaines causes pLausibLes et 
importantes. Ces considerations de nature poLitique doivent etre devoilees. 
Enfin, Les institutions, qui operent ces choix, influencent Les resuLtats de 
/'analyse. Des /ors, ii est necessaire de Les examiner. Chacun de ces trois 
aspects de la theorie de la causalite, ainsi que Les reponses officielles, sont 
analyses a la lumiere de la catastrophe de la mine Westray, en Nouvelle-Ecosse, 
qui a ete la cause du deces de 29 mineurs. L 'auteur soutient que si Les objectijs 
politiques ne visent uniquement que la protection des travailleurs, a/ors le 
contexte politique et economique qui favorise la mise en place de conditions de 
travail dangereuses doit etre considere comme etant un facteur important 
d'accidents. fl est cependant peu probable que Les reponses officielles a cette 
catastrophe rejletent cette approche. 
Introduction 
Nearly three years have now passed since the morning of May 9, 1992 when we 
awoke to the awful news that there had been an explosion at the Westray Mine 
in Nova Scotia and that 26 miners were trapped underground. In the days that 
followed, as we watched and waited, hoping that survivors would be found, we 
also began to ask, how did this happen and who is responsible? Despite the 
efforts of Curragh Resources Inc.,-the mine's owner-to manage the news, 1 
information began to trickle out strongly suggesting that systemic failures at 
many levels caused the disaster. 2 
Since the explosion, there has been a flurry of legal and administrative 
activity in response to the disaster. Charges under provincial health and safety 
laws were belatedly brought and then dropped after Curragh and two of its 
employees, Gerald Phillips, the former Westray mine manager, and Roger Parry, 
l. By 8:30 that morning, Curragh had retained Tom Reid, a Bay Street public 
relations consultant, to direct their efforts. See S. Cameron & A. Mitrovica, 
"Burying Westray" Saturday Night (May 1994) 54 at 56. Shaun Comish, a Westray 
miner who participated in the rescue effort, described the company's efforts at news 
management in his The Westray Tragedy (Halifax: Femwood, 1993) at 48: "I have 
never seen so much snow in May. The media was snowed, and so was everyone 
else. The company controlled every bit of information given out to the public and 
the families." 
2. These causes are explored in H. Glasbeek & E. Tucker, Death by Consensus: The 
Westray Story Working Paper No. 3 (Toronto: Centre for Research in Work and· 
Society, York University, 1992); published in a slightly modified form in (1993) 
New Solutions 14 (further citations to New Solutions). For a more detailed account 
of events, see D. Jobb, Calculated Risk (Halifax: Nimbus, 1994). 
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the former underground manager, were charged with manslaughter and criminal 
negligence. These charges were dismissed as inadequate and, subsequently, 
successfully relaid. After much wrangling, an indictment was preferred, thus 
. avoiding the need for a preliminary inquiry. The trial began in February 1995 
and promises to be a lengthy one. If there are appeals, it could be years before 
final disposition of all charges. 3 
Families of the victims filed notice of an intent to sue Curragh Resources, its 
Board of Directors, Clifford Frame (Curragh's chief executive officer), the 
manufacturers of machinery used in the mine and the governments of Nova 
Scotia and Canada, but they are awaiting the result of the criminal trial. 
Compensation for the families of miners who died is being paid by the Nova 
Scotia Workers' Compensation Board and it is estimated that the benefits will 
total $15 million, although this could increase (or decrease) depending of future 
changes to pension benefit levels.4 An internal review of the behaviour of the 
mine inspectors who attended Westray was conducted by the Department of 
Labour. It found that the mine inspectors operated within acceptable 
departmental practices.5 An external review of the management practices and 
operational procedures of the Nova Scotia Department of Labour and its 
Occupational Health and Safety Division was conducted by Coopers & Lybrand 
for the provincial Auditor General. It found serious deficiencies.6 The 
Occupational Health and Safety Advisory Council in Nova Scotia was 
commissioned to review the Nova Scotia Occupational Health and Safety Act 
(OHSA) and regulations. It endorsed the internal responsibility system as the 
3. R. v. Curragh Inc. (1993), 124 N.S.R.(2d) 59 (Prov. Ct.) and (1994), 125 
N.S.R.(2d) 185 (Prov. Ct.). Already, there is a cloud of legal uncertainty hanging 
over the trial because the presiding judge took the unusual step of calling the 
director of prosecutions to complain about the performance of the lead prosecutor. 
The judge refused to declare a mistrial and the Supreme Court quashed the 
application of the Crown for leave to appeal on the ground that the court had no 
jurisdiction to hear an appeal at this stage of the hearing. The court expressed no 
view of the application's merits. R. v. Curragh, [1995) S.C.C.A. No. 138 (QL). 
Another motion to stay the proceedings has been brought, based on an allegation 
that the prosecution is withholding evidence. "Westray Trial Hits New Snag" 
[Halifax] Daily News (11 May 1995). 
4. Canadian Occupational Health and Safety News (8 February & 24 May 1993). The 
possibility of benefit levels decreasing is a real one as a "reform" bill was recently 
passed by the Nova Scotia legislature. Benefit levels are to be calculated on after-
tax rather than gross income and survivor pensions are terminated at age 65. 
Workers' Compensation Act, S.N.S. 1994-1995, c.10. 
5. "Westray Probe Clears Two Mine Inspectors" Toronto Star (22 April 1993) Al3. 
6. Coopers & Lybrand, "Review of the Management Practices of the Nova Scotia 
Department of Labour: Final Report" (2 April 1993). 
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best means to ensure a safe workplace and recommended more education and 
statutory clarification of the rights and obligations of the workplace parties. 7 
A public inquiry was ordered by the provincial government, but it was 
stayed by the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal because of the risk that the accused's 
right to a fair trial could be prejudiced. The Supreme Court of Canada lifted the 
stay in May 1995, because the accused chose trial by judge alone, making a 
decision of the merits moot.8 Finally, Curragh is in receivership and its assets are 
being sold off. Functionally, if not legally, it has ceased to exist and any 
judgements or penalties against it will be difficult to recover.9 
Despite all this activi_ty, in three years, no one has been held legally 
responsible, there has been no official determination of the cause of the disaster, 
hardly any facts have been officially found, few recommendations have been 
made by officialdom and no laws or regulations have been amended. It is still 
possible that, eventually, available legal and administrative mechanisms will 
punish wrongdoers, identify the disaster's more immediate causes and produce 
some positive recommendations and reforms, but it is unlikely that systemic 
causes will be addressed, leading to more fundamental change. 
For those concerned to advance the struggle to improve health and safety 
conditions at work, it is crucial to understand what caused the Westray mine 
disaster and why the various legal and administrative responses to it are unlikely 
to provide adequate analyses of its causes or to generate effective reforms. This 
task runs headlong into the politics of causation. 
Causation analysis is densely political in at least three interrelated senses. 
First, causation analysis is crucial to our system of attributing responsibility, 
whether in a moral, legal, economic or political sense. Because of this, causation 
theories perform political work and are apt to be selected accordingly. Lawyers 
and public relations consultants are acutely aware of this and routinely use 
causation analysis in crudely instrumental ways to advance the interests of their 
clients. 
Causation is political in a second, more subtle and pervasive sense. While it 
is not true that everything causes everything else, a large number of events and 
actions are, in some sense, causally connected to a particular outcome. Thus, 
while there may be agreement that some factors can be eliminated because they 
7. Nova Scotia, Occupational Health and Safety Advisory Council, Taking 
Responsibility (Halifax: Nova Scotia Occupational Health and Safety Advisory 
Council, 1995). · 
8. Phillips v. Nova Scotia (Commission of Inquiry into the Westray Mine Tragedy), 
[1995] S.C.M. No.36 (QL}, rev'g (sub nom. Phillips et al. v. Richards J.) 116 
N.S.R.(2d) 30 (S.C.T.D.). Argument was heard by the Supreme Court of Canada in 
May 1994. No decision has been issued at the time of writing. 
9. The legal proceedings include R. v. Curragh Inc., [1994] OJ. Nos. 1116, 1183 and 
1452 (QL). Curragh has a $5 million trust fund which might be tapped for damages. 
See Jobb, supra note 2 at 273. 
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are not causal in any sense, there is room for substantial disagreement about the 
relative significance of the many events that are causal in some sense. 
Various criteria may be used to assess the relative significance of multiple 
causes. One set of criteria can be derived from the goals being pursued. For 
· example, if our goal is to prevent future harm to workers, the choice of 
significant causal factors is likely to be different than it would be if our goal is to 
find a person or entity obliged to compensate the families of the most recent 
victims. 
Yet, even where there is apparent agreement on the goal, often more subtle 
differences remain. Typically, these relate to underlying disagreements over the 
mutability or desirability of existing social arrangements. Thus, for example, if 
hazardous working conditions are, in some sense, an inevitable by-product of 
capitalist relations of production, but capitalism is seen as good or necessary, 
then the goal of protecting workers will be reformulated. It will be to protect 
workers within capitalist relations of production. Once the goal is restated in this 
way, the system of production and its supporting ideology will cease to be 
identified as causally significant and, therefore, requiring change. This is not 
because they are not causal, but because there is a prior commitment to the 
necessity or desirability of maintaining those relations. This commitment may be 
unarticulated, but it nevertheless influences the selection of significant causes. 
The problem with many causation disputes is that their political underpinnings 
are so deeply concealed that the issue is never joined. 
This leads to a third dimension of the politics of causation. The terrain on 
which judges and other public officials operate is shaped by prevailing political-
economic conditions, dominant ideological assumptions and the particular 
institutional context in which the causal question is addressed. Not only do these 
factors militate against the selection of approaches to causation that emphasize 
systemic conditions, the opportunity to raise and interrogate the underlying 
political commitments that inform dominant conceptions of causation is also 
severely constrained. Some fora, however, are more amenable to an 
interrogation of systemic issues than others. In particular, public inquiries offer 
greater opportunities than civil or criminal trials, but there will always be 
formidable resistance to approaches that call into question fundamental social 
relations and deeply entrenched beliefs. 
In the sections that follow, each of the three senses in which causation is 
political is examined in more detail. First, the instrumental use of causation 
analysis and the political work performed by some commonly used approaches 
is critically scrutinized. Next, the argument is made that the underlying causes of 
the Westray mine disaster are to be found in the particular political economy of 
Atlantic Canada and Pictou County and in a series of deeply rooted ideological 
assumptions that inform decision-making by private and public sector actors and 
that, unless this social context is addressed, reforms will have only limited 
impact. The third section considers the possibilities and limitations for raising 
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the underlying causes and getting them officially recognized in different 
institutional settings. The strategic implications of this analysis will be briefly 
considered in the conclusion. 
The Instrumental Uses of Causation Analysis 
Events typically have multiple causes. Usually, a combination of causes is 
necessary to produce a result and, in some cases, more than one causal factor is 
sufficient by itself. Moreover, one can trace the antecedents to an event back in 
an infinite regression. Because of this, different people can plausibly describe 
the cause{s) of a disaster in very different ways and disagree about whether an 
antecedent event or condition is properly considered causal. This condition of 
overdetermination makes fertile the ground for disputes over causation that are 
more likely to be driven by politics than by science. 
One could, for example, start and end a discussion of the causes of the 
Westray mine disaster with a geological description of the Foord coal seam, 
focusing on its fault conditions and gaseousness. This approach to causation 
eliminates human agency from the analysis and, for this reason, is often 
advanced by mine operators and others potentially facing allegations of blame. 
Thus, in 1900, American mine inspector Thomas K. Adam, in a speech to the 
Western Pennsylvania Central Mining Institute, reported: 
During [calamitous mine disasters] we have. as usual, a plenteous crop of 
apologists ... who appear on the surface ... Those men are very resourceful in 
offering all kinds of excuses for those who are possibly responsible for such 
calamities. They will tell us ... that those mine explosions are the unavoidable 
and natural accompaniments which give harmony to the coal mining 
industry. 10 
One such "surface" man appeared in the aftermath of the Westray disaster. Colin 
Benner, Curragh's Executive Vice President, Operations, was their spokesperson 
on the scene. 11 Two days after the explosion, he suggested, "some people are 
10. Quoted in D. J. Curran, Dead laws for Dead Men (Pittsburgh: University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 1993) at 49-50. 
11. Comish, supra note 1 at 48, refers to Benner as "the pretty boy they had brought in 
from Toronto ... He did an excellent job of making the public feel sorry for the poor 
company ... ". 
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assuming that human error is the only possible cause of such a tragedy ... Nature 
cannot always be controlled."12 
Another approach to workplace disaster analysis is the "unsafe acts" theory 
of causation. This theory identifies the careless or reckless behaviour of workers 
· as the primary cause of workplace deaths and injuries. It too has a long historical 
lineage. The first factory inspectors in England and Ontario, for example, 
attributed most accidents to workers' "love for amusement, their inattention, 
their recklessness." 13 It also has been relied upon to explain death and injury in 
underground coal mining. For example, H. S. Poole, one of the first mine 
inspectors in Nova Scotia and later the agent for the Acadia Coal Company, was 
inclined to blame accidents on the rashness and ignorance of miners, while 
American coal mine operators at the turn of the century asserted (without data) 
that 99% of all mine accidents "are due absolutely to the careless or wilful 
negligence of the men employed in them."14 
To date, no one has publicly asserted that the Westray miners were the 
authors of their own misfortune, but it would not be surprising if allegations of 
worker misconduct or complicity in the violation of mining regulations were to 
emerge in the course of some of the pending legal proceedings. 15 
Despite their differences, the "natural causes" and "unsafe acts" theories of 
causation perform similar political work; they exonerate employers and 
governments and obviate the need to inquire into systemic conditions which 
shape their behaviour as well as the behaviour of working miners. This is 
accomplished, in part, by assigning primary causation to nature or careless 
workers and by treating the most immediate cause as the most important one. 
I 2. Canadian Press (I I May I 992). The public relations strategy followed by Benner 
was devised by Tom Reid, Curragh's public relations consultant. The first "key 
message" he recommended was: "This is a terrible human tragedy that could not be 
foreseen." Cited in Cameron & Mitrovica, supra note I at 56. 
13. These are the words of Mr. Whymper, superintending inspector of the Southern 
counties of England, which were reprinted by Ontario factory inspector Barber in 
his Annual Report for I 888. See E. Tucker, Administering Danger in the 
Workplace (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, I 990) at I 60. 
14. D. MacLeod, "Colliers, Colliery Safety and Workplace Control: The Nova Scotia 
Experience, 1873-1910" in Canadian Historical Association, Historical Papers 
(1983), 233; Coal Trade Bulletin cited in W. Graebner, Coal-Mining Safety in the 
Progressive Period: the Political Economy of Reform (Lexington: University Press 
of Kentucky, 1976) at 25. 
15. It has been suggested by J. H. Ryan. Coal in Our Blood (Halifax: Formac, 1992), 
that the inexperience of the Westray miners made them less aware of the special 
hazards of the Foord coal seam and that this may have contributed to the disaster. 
"Author Cites Miners' Inexperience in Westray Disaster" Toronto Star (30 
November I 992) A 13. She did not, however, allege that the workers themselves 
created the danger. 
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The latter assumption is of dubious validity. 16 For example, even if it were 
correct to say that the immediate cause of a roof fall was unstable geological 
conditions, it is arguable that the more important causes included the decision by 
the mine developer to mine in an area known to be unstable and the existence of 
legal and administrative systems which allow this to occur. After all, if the 
practice of mining in geologically unstable environments is not closely regulated 
or stopped altogether, we can be sure there will be other roof falls, even if we 
cannot know just when and where they will occur. Overall, then, perhaps the 
most important political work done by these theories is to divert attention from 
routine business and government behaviour. 
The focus on immediate causes also explains why these theories tend to 
construct disasters as "accidents" in the sense of being unplanned and 
unintentional occurrences. This characterization is contestable as well because, 
in retrospect, these disasters can also be viewed as the predictable result qf 
conscious decisions to engage in, permit or encourage risky behaviour. 17 
Workers' compensation boards and private insurers calculate premiums based on 
this knowledge. Yet, when an injury is simply described as the result of an 
"accident" rather than as the predictable outcome of a conscious decision to 
engage in hazardous activities, the people who made or pe~itted that decision 
and the system which allowed or encouraged them to do so, are rendered 
invisible and, therefore, not responsible or, at the very least, the degree of 
responsibility they are made to bear is diminished. 
The Political Economy of a Disaster 
Because events are causally overdetermined, many observers have properly 
concluded that objective causation is unobtainable. 18 But this does not mean that 
any causal analysis is as good as any other. Theories of causation can be 
evaluated against a set of goals. These are, of course, politically determined, but 
by making the goals of causation analysis explicit, we can clarify the real 
16. For an insightful discussion of causal primacy issues, see E. 0. Wright et al., 
Reconstructing Marxism (London: Verso, 1992) at 129-75. 
17. The somewhat paradoxical definition of accidents is captured by K. Figlio, "What 
is an Accident" in P. Weindling, ed., The Social History of Occupational Health 
(London: Croon Helm, 1985) 180 at 180. "It is an unforeseen event which is also 
expected ... The number and the kinds of accidents show regularities, but the 
moment of any one accident remains unknown, although it is often retrospectively 
'predictable'." 
18. H. L.A. Hart & T. Honore, Causation in the Law, 2d ed. (Oxford: Clarendon,. 
1985). On the history of "objective causation" in law, see M. J. Horwitz, The 
Transformation of American Law, 1870-1960 (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1992) at 54-63. 
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differences between positions. The argument here, then, is that if the goal is to 
protect workers "tout court," then the political-economic conditions and 
ideological assumptions that promote the creation of risky work environments 
. must be considered as major causes. Tragically, the events leading up to the 
Westray mine disaster support this claim.19 
The failure to control the conditions that resulted in the Westray mine 
disaster is fundamentally rooted in a system which privileges private wealth 
creation over public intervention in the economy. The starting point is that 
private owners should be able to do with their property as they wish. They are to 
be allowed to decide how much to invest, when to invest, where to invest and for 
how long to invest; what to produce and how to produce it; and what kind of, 
and how many, employees to use. 
The state mediates this to a degree, depending on the relative power of 
capital, labour and the state. Workers in Third World nations are the most 
disadvantaged and the resulting environmental and occupational harm is often 
the greatest. Bhopal is one recent example of this.20 In Canada, the power 
imbalance generally is not as great, but the differences between industrialized 
and developing countries should not be exaggerated. In Nova Scotia, conditions 
are particularly favourable for capital. This is because of the dominance of staple 
extraction in the economy. Resource development is viewed as the engine of 
economic growth. Historically, governments have had to subsidize resource 
extraction through massive infra-structure expenditures. They do so in the hope 
that the return on the sale of the resources will produce revenues which will both 
repay the government and lead to the development of local manufacturing and 
service industries. 21 However, because the markets for the resources are volatile 
and beyond the control of government, the state has few tools to manage the 
economy. If the anticipated growth of local industry fails to materialize, the 
state's reliance on capital's willingness to invest only increases, producing a 
profound dependency on private actors. Close links between government and 
19. This section draws heavily on Glasbeek & Tucker, supra note 2. Since we 
published that account, two books have appeared which support our analysis. See 
Comish, supra note I and Jobb, supra note 2. 
20. J. Cassels, The Uncertain Promise of Law (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1993) c. 2. 
21. For example, the development of the Grande Cache coal mines in Alberta in the 
1960s required the construction of a new town, transport and railway facilities, and 
power and gas installations. This was done at public expense. When the mine 
faltered and employment and revenue levels dropped, a royal commission was 
appointed by the province. It found that the province had agreed to participate in 
the venture "without any realistic or independent investigation of its economic 
feasibility." Alberta, Grande Cache Commission, Final Report (Edmonton, 1973) 
at 114. The examples could be multiplied. 
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would-be investors become the norm. Under such conditions, the level of state 
mediation of the rights of property is likely to be low. 22 
While the conditions of dependency are greater in Nova Scotia than, 
perhaps, in more industrialized provinces like Ontario, capital's dominant 
position has not been eroded significantly anywhere in Canada. Moreover, as 
capital becomes increasingly footloose in the new global economy, the capacity 
and willingness of all states to regulate employers diminishes. 23 Indeed, in this 
environment, the policy of the government to do everything it can to create a 
favourable investment climate is readily defended as being in the public interest. 
The effect of this kind of political economy and its supporting ideological 
assumptions on the events leading up to the Westray disaster can be seen first in 
the decision to establish the mine and then in the failure of the regulatory regime 
to control the hazardous conditions in the mine. 
The Decision to Mine 
The decision of the provincial government to switch from oil to coal to generate 
electricity sparked private sector interest in the Pictou coai fields in the early 
1980s. Despite the well-known history of coal mine disasters in this area, none 
of the feasibility studies they conducted identified the health and safety of 
22. For an overview, see J. Brodie, The Political Economy of Canadian Regionalism 
(Toronto: Harcourt, Brace Jovanovich, 1990). 
23. For example, see D. Drache & M. S. Gertler, eds., The New Era of Global 
Competition (Montreal: McGill-Queen's 1.Jniversity Press, 1991); B. Campbell, 
Moving in the Wrong Direction: Globalization, the North American Free Trade 
Agreement and Sustainable Development (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Policy 
Alternatives, 1993). It has been suggested that Nova Scotia's earlier experience of 
dependency may prefigure Canada's future. See M. Earle & I. McKay, 
"Introduction: Industrial Legality in Nova Scotia" in M. Earle & I. McKay, eds., 
Workers and the State in Twentieth Century Nova Scotia (Fredericton: Acadiensis 
Press, 1989) 9 at 17. By way of illustration, at the annual convention of the 
Prospectors and Developers' Association of Canada held in Toronto in March 
1994, Robert Smith, president of the American Barrick Resources Corporation, 
complained that government regulations and taxes in Canada have contributed to "a 
climate of hostility" and is causing mining companies to direct their exploration 
dollars to other countries. Anne McLennan, the federal Natural Resources Minister, 
reassured the conventioneers that the government is committed to having a viable 
and competitive mining industry in Canada and proudly pointed to the 1994 budget 
which introduced new tax write-offs for mining companies and promised to 
examine the investment climate and the regulatory restraints imposed on the. 
industry. R. Haliechuk, "Mine Renounces 'Climate Hostility' Driving Industry 
Out" Toronto Star (8 March 1994) D2. 
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miners as an independent consideration.24 This silence is remarkable. It also has 
deep roots. For example, in 1888 Sir William Dawson, a native son of Pictou 
County and a noted geologist who had become principal of McGill University, 
was responding to a paper by Nova Scotia mines' inspector Edward Gilpin. He 
commented: 
The difficulties that had occurred in mining some of the pits, especially in 
regard to flammable gases, had caused considerable trouble and many serious 
accidents, notwithstanding the precautions that had been taken and the means 
provided for the ventilation of the mines. It was a matter of great regret that so 
much good coal had been lost by these accidents, and it was to be hoped that 
the mining companies would guard against them so that the loss of life and of 
money might be reduced.25 
As this statement suggests, the failure to consider, independently, the health 
and safety of working miners is, in part, attributable to a world view which puts 
at least as much value on coal and money as on the lives of miners. 
A more recent, if perhaps extreme, illustration of this outlook is found in a 
book entitled, Risk Taking in Canadian Mining. It is composed of a series of 
vignettes celebrating individual mine developers. There is literally no mention of 
the risks faced by working miners anywhere in this volume. A comment in the 
"Introduction" suggests why this is so. "The risks of physical danger have never 
been as great as the risk of losing property and investment."26 Given this 
perspective, there is no need to be independently concerned with the health and 
safety of worl6ng miners either because the risks they are exposed to are 
considered relatively insignificant, or because mine developers will protect 
underground miners insofar as it is consistent with their desire to protect their 
own property.27 
24. On the history of disasters, see J. M. Cameron, Pictonian Colliers (Halifax: Nova 
Scotia Museum, 1974) and Ryan, supra note 15. 
25. E. Gilpin, Coal Mining in Nova Scotia (Montreal: John Lovell, 1888) at 
35. 
26. J. Carrington et al., eds., Risk Taking in Canadian Mining (Toronto: Pitt, 1979) at 
11. Frank Miller, then Treasurer of Ontario, in his preface to the volume, asserts (at 
6) that there has been "an over-reaction against risk taking." A foreword by E.G. 
Thompson, at 7, then the President of the Association, calls for an 
acknowledgement of the "debt of gratitude" owed to "our risk-takers." There is no 
suggestion that this extends to working miners. 
27. In this context, it is telling that the only time health and safety risks were 
highlighted as significant by the private Westray mine developers was in a memo 
Clifford Frame wrote, dated 9 November 1988, defending the proposed deal when 
it was criticized by some Ottawa bureaucrats as being too favourable to Curragh. 
"A lot can go wrong in the development of this mine," he warned and then 
proceeded to list the potential problems including unforeseen geological faults, 
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While the failure of private resource companies to consider workers' health 
and safety other than as an aspect of profit-making is readily understandable, 
working miners have paid dearly for this with their lives and health. Why, then, 
did two levels of government not require occupational health and safety 
assessments to be performed as a condition of granting approval for or assistance 
to mining operations? The federal government had the Canada Centre for 
Mineral and Energy Technology (CANMET) conduct a technical review of the 
mining plan and, while its report raised more health and safety issues than the 
private reports, the bottom line was, again, economic. "The real question is 
whether this property [my emphasis] can bear the cost of the learning c~rve ... "28 
Since occupational health and safety in the mine was a provincial 
responsibility, the federal government could and, after the explosion, did take 
the position that this was a matter for the Nova Scotia government. Under Nova 
Scotia law, however, employers are not required to establish, in advance, that a 
planned undertaking can be conducted safely. Rather, they must notify the 
Department of Labour when work is to commence. From then on, the 
department can insist that operations be conducted according to provincial health 
and safety laws. Where, however, a· firm seeks financial support from the 
government, there is nothing to prevent the government from requiring an 
occupational health and safety assessment as a condition of its involvement. This 
was not done even though there were numerous warnings from various sources 
that the proposed mine development was hazardous.29 
The federal and provincial governments' lack of concern for occupational 
health and safety reflects the effect of conditions of dependent development on 
their priorities. Nova Scotia politicians were desperate for the investment. The 
fact that the mine was in the provincial riding of Don Cameron, a provincial 
cabinet minister at the time the Westray proposal was being negotiated, and in 
the federal riding of Elmer McKay, then a senior Conservative Nova Scotia 
member of cabinet (who had stepped aside in 1983 to give Brian Mulroney a 
safe seat until the next election), only strengthened the hand of the mine's 
principal promotor, Clifford Frame. He had the ear of particularly powerful 
politicians anxious to attract investment. Local people, organizations and unions 
were in a weak position to demand that a complete occupational health and 
safety assessment be conducted as a condition of government financial 
participation. The people of Pictou County were desperate for jobs. Between 
1981 and 1986, the region's population declined as working-age people left to 
poor roof and floor conditions, excess methane, unskilled and inexperienced 
workers and underground fires. Cited in Jobb, supra note 2 at 158-59. 
28. Canada Centre for Mineral and Energy Technology, Westray Coal Incorporated 
Pictou County Coal Project: Technical Review [n.d.] at 8 [emphasis added]. 
29. On the warnings, see Jobb, supra note 2 at 121-22, 141, 157-61, 168-70, 176, 181; 
Glasbeek & Tucker, supra note 2 at 17. 
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find employment elsewhere. Unemployment in the county increased from 9.2% 
to 17.6% during the same period. Annual family income in the county was less 
than the provincial average and manufacturing jobs were rapidly disappearing.30 
Trade unions in Nova Scotia were also not faring particularly well. In 1989 and 
· 1990, Nova Scotia had the second lowest rate of unionization in Canada.31 
Under these conditions, it is not surprising that occupational health and 
safety considerations were all but excluded from the deal-making between the 
government and the Westray mine developers; government officials and private 
developers were not inclined to raise them, and labour and social movements 
were too weak to make this issue a priority. 
The Regulation of Mining Activity 
Effective implementation of a regulatory scheme cannot be assumed, as the 
political-economic environment shapes both law creation and enforcement. 
Occupational health and safety regulation is no exception. Beginning with the 
first legislation enacted in the 19th century, enforcement problems have been 
endemic. Inspectors have chosen not to prosecute employers found to be in 
violation of health and safety standards, but rather have issued directives and 
warnings. This approach was justified on the assumption that non-compliance 
was the result of ignorance or organizational incompetence, not intentional 
wrong-doing. After all, inspectors believed that safety paid and that profit-
maximizing employers would find it was in their interest to comply with the law, 
especially when the law only obliged employers to take measures "reasonably 
required in the circumstances" and economic feasibility was taken into account 
by inspectors in determining what was reasonable. Because workers' interests in 
health and safety were presumed to be identical to their employers', there was no 
need for the inspector to actively involve workers, except to urge them not to be 
careless. With gentle prodding by he inspector, the employers' internal 
responsibility system (IRS) would be a reliable instrument to achieve 
compliance with the law. 32 
Worker health and safety struggles in the 1970s brought about some 
significant changes to the regulatory scheme. One of the most important is the 
reform of the IRS. Workers obtained the right to participate in joint health and 
safety committees, the right to know about hazards in the workplace and the 
30. Statistics Canada data presented in Acres International Limited, Westray Coal Mine 
Initial Environmental Evaluation:: Final Report, January 1990 (Ottawa: Industry, 
Science and Technology Canada, 1990) at 4-18, 4-26. 
31. Only Alberta had a lower union density. Statistics Canada, Annual Reports under 
the Corporations and Labour Union Reporting Act (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 
1989-1990). 
32. Tucker, Administering Danger in the Workplace, supra note 13 at 137-76. 
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right to refuse unsafe work. The primary role of the inspector, however, still is 
not to police health and safety crimes, but to facilitate the operation of the 
reformed IRS. 
For workers, the reformed regime creates some new opportunities to contest 
hazardous conditions at work. The rights of workers, however, are carefully 
circumscribed and their ability to use them effectively varies enormously, 
depending on a variety of factors, including their level of employment security 
and bargaining leverage. Non-unionized workers employed by economically 
marginal employers are unlikely to be able to exert much pressure through the 
IRS and, consequently, occupational health and safety regulations will not be 
enforced.33 
To some extent, the history of mine safety regulation in Nova Scotia departs 
from this pattern, reflecting its particular political economic his~ory. The earliest 
legislation, enacted in 1873, established minimum standards to be enforced by 
an inspector. Subsequent amendments, brought about by the lobbying· of the 
miners' union in the aftermath of mine disasters (some in Pi.ctou County), 
strengthened both the external responsibility system and empowered miners by 
giving them the right to form mine committees authorized to conduct inspections 
and investigate accidents, and to initiate prosecutions against mine managers. 
Yet, despite the fact that Nova Scotia miners won limited legal control rights 
nearly 100 years before most other workers in Canada, the law was weakly 
enforced and miners suffered the consequences. 34 
By the 1980s, health and safety laws in Nova Scotia lagged behind those in 
other provinces. At the time of the Westray disaster, fines for most violations of 
the Coal Mine Regulation Act were abysmally low ($250) and charges had to be 
laid within six months of the date of the violation. Nova Scotia was also one of 
the last provinces to enact modern health and safety legislation ( 1985) and the 
fines provided for violations of that act are at the medium to low end of the 
national spectrum. Moreover, sanctions were infrequently used, even by 
Canadian standards. From 1985 to 1990, a total of 14 companies were charged 
with offences under the Nova Scotia OHSA. No mining companies were 
prosecuted, despite the fact that, according to another tabulation, between fiscal 
33. For differing assessments of the general effectiveness of health and safety 
committees, see C. Tuohy & M. Simard, The Impact of Joint Health and Safety 
Committees in Ontario and Quebec; E. Tucker, "And Defeat Goes On: An 
Assessment of Third Wave Health and Safety Regulation" in F. Pearce & L. Snider, 
eds., Corporate Crime: Contemporary Debates (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1995) [forthcoming]. Both studies recognize, however, that committee 
effectiveness will vary from workplace to workplace. 
34. MacLeod, supra note 14 at 232-41; I. McKay, ''The Realm of Uncertainty: The· 
Experience of Work in the Cumberland Coal Mines, 1873-1927" (1986) 16 
Acadiensis 3 at 43-53. Miners in British Columbia obtained the legal right to 
inspect in 1877. 
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years 1987-1988 and 1991-1992, 1037 directives were issued to mmmg 
companies. As the Westray example sadly demonstrates, it should not be 
assumed that the reasons directives do not lead to charges is because mining 
companies comply promptly.35 
· Shaun Comish, a Westray miner, vividly describes the horrific conditions he 
encountered in the Westray mine before it exploded. Cave-ins occurred 
regularly, methane levels rose above permissible levels, flammable materials 
were kept in the mine, improperly designed equipment was used underground, 
fires occurred and little or no rock dust was spread to reduce the risk of 
explosion from the accumulation of coal dust. Other workers have given similar 
accounts of the unsafe conditions in the mines. 36 These serious hazards did not 
go undetected by· mining inspectors but, despite the employer's failure to 
improve conditions, they never halted mine operations or initiated prosecutions. 
Instead, time lines for achieving compliance were extended. For example, after 
at least six months of prodding, the first order to resolve the coal dust problem 
was issued on 29 April 1992, l 0 days before the explosion. Despite the fact that 
the order required an immediate clean-up, the inspectors failed to monitor 
compliance. 37 
Although the pattern of non-enforcement at the Westray mine was not 
exceptional, and then Minister of Labour, Leroy Legere was probably accurate 
when, in defending his department against charges of favouritism before the 
explosion, he declared that "the people in the Department of Labour are not 
treating the Westray Mine any differently than they are treating any other mine 
in the province,"38 there were specific conditions at the mine that exacerbated 
the situation. Curragh was in dire financial straits in 1991. It was losing money 
from its other mines and desperately needed a cash flow from the Westray mine. 
This was not materializing because it could not meet its supply commitments. 
Local mine management was under pressure to produce, and workers were 
offered production bonuses and unlimited overtime. Under these conditions, the 
incent.ive to cut corners on safety to increase production is great. 
The cosy relationships between the mine owners and the politicians may 
also have influenced Department of Labour enforcement practices. Although no 
35. Data was compiled from Nova Scotia, Department of Labour, Annual Reports 
(1985-1986 to 1991-1992) and from letter from Jim LeBlanc, Director, 
Occupational Health/Safety Training, Nova Scotia Department of Labour to Eric 
Tucker ( 19 August 1992). There are some discrepancies in the data. For evidence 
of enforcement deficits in other jurisdictions, see R. Brown, "Theory and Practice 
of Regulatory Enforcement: Occupational Health and Safety Regulation in British 
Columbia" (1994) 16 Law & Policy 63. 
36. Comish, supra note I; Glasbeek & Tucker, supra note 2 at 22-23; Jobb, supra note 
2 at c. 2 and c. 11. 
37. Jobb, ibid. at c. 11. 
38. Nova Scotia, House of Assembly, Debates and Proceedings (10 July 1991 ). 
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hard evidence has emerged, a number of former Westray miners have voiced 
their suspicion that there was political interference with the mine inspectors.39 
The internal responsibility system also seems to have been particularly 
ineffective at the Westray mine. A joint health and safety committee was only 
established in the fall of 1991, at the prompting of the Department of Labour, 
and, according to Randy Facette-an experienced miner who was an employee 
representative on the committee-it was a "joke." Complaints he passed along 
from workers were ignored.40 Attempts by workers to bring their concerns 
directly to management's attention were equally futile. 41 
The absence of a union at Westray prior to the explosion contributed to this 
state of worker powerlessness. Out of either ignorance or fear, non-unionized 
workers rarely exercise their right to refuse unsafe work.42 Quitting was the only 
other option, and while some miners took this route, many others stayed on 
despite the existence of conditions they knew to be hazardous. The reasons for 
this may not, at first glance, be apparent, even to the miners themselves.'0 One 
powerful incentive, especially for workers in an industry in which employment 
is often precarious and in a region in which there are few jobs, was the promise 
of steady work. Comish writes: "A lot of people ask me why we kept working 
there. I guess the only answer I can give is that nowadays when you have a job it 
is very scary to quit and hope to get a job somewhere else. I often felt that 
maybe things would get better someday ... The promise of fifteen years of steady 
work weighed heavy on your mind."44 In addition, processes of socialization that 
39. For example, Comish, supra note 1 at 22 states: "From what I have heard and seen 
so far of the Labour Department ... I truly believe the mine inspectors' hands were 
tied and their mouths were tightly gagged by some political power." Also see Jobb, 
supra note 2 at 23-24, 206 and 210-12 for additional expressions of concern. 
40. Quoted in N. Robb, "The History of Westray" (July/August 1993) Occupational 
Health and Safety Canada 43. Also see Jobb, supra note 2 at 205. 
41. Comish, supra note 1 at 13, states: "Mining has come a long way over the years, 
but this place was like stepping back in time. The 'my way or the highway' attitude 
was alive and well at Westray." Also see Jobb, ibid. 
42. The overwhelming majority of work refusals occur in unionized workplaces. For 
example, in Ontario in 1991, 79% of all work refusals occurred in unionized 
premises (Data provided by the Ontario Ministry of Labour, 22 October 1992). 
Moreover, the question of when a work refusal is legally justified is not altogether 
clear. For example, when some of Curragh's unionized employees at the Faro mine 
refused to work because there had been an "unusual" number of sulphur dioxide 
fume-producing fires in its ore mill, the arbitrator upheld the disciplinary sanctions 
imposed on them, in part because their work was not sufficiently unsafe at the time 
that they walked out. Curragh Resources Inc. v. U.S.W.A., Local /051(1990),5 
C.O.H.S.C. 81. 
43. Comish, supra note 1 at 27, writes: "I still can't figure out why I didn't quit a dozen 
times." 
44. Ibid at 28. 
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encourage male workers to view hazardous conditions as something which 
strong men endure, and cognitive dissonance that leads to excessive discounting 
of the objective reality of danger, operate to "reduce collective or individual 
resistance to imposed risk and to discourage exit from the situation.45 
In sum, the political-economic conditions under which the decision to mine 
was made and under which occupational health and safety regulation was 
conducted weighed heavily against serious attention being given to the health 
and safety of workers. As a result, a profit-driven mining company, heavily 
subsidized by two levels of government, was permitted by the authorities to 
mine in an extremely hazardous physical environment more or less as it saw fit. 
While it is important to understand the immediate causes of the explosion, the 
underlying conditions that allowed those immediate causes to materialize must 
be understood if there is a serious commitment to prevent such disasters in the 
future. 
The Aftermath: The Institutional Politics of Causation 
Will the systemic causes of the Westray explosion be identified and addressed in 
any of the post-disaster proceedings? Clearly, it is too early to offer definitive 
answers but, by drawing on historical experience, we can assess its likelihood in 
three contexts: tort proceedings, criminal trials and public inquiries. 
Tort 
Workers' compensation replaces the loss of income suffered by surviving family 
members reasonably well but, because benefits are awarded regardless of fault, 
inquiry is only made into the work relatedness, not the causes, of death and 
disablement.46 Other provisions in workers' compensation legislation that 
ostensibly aim to create economic incentives for employers to improve health 
and safety conditions, including experience rating or penalty assessments based 
45. Generally, see P. Willis, Learning to Labor (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1981) and G. A. Ackerlof & W. T. Dickens, "The Economic Consequences 
of Cognitive Dissonance" (1982) 72 American Economic Review 307. On Nova 
Scotia coal miners, see McKay, supra note 34 at 52-57. 
46. A. Bale, "America's First Compensation Crisis: Conflict over the Value and 
Meaning of Workplace Injuries under the Employers' Liability System" in D. 
Rosner & G. Markowitz, eds., Dying for Work (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1989) 34, argues that American entrepreneurs supported the creation of a 
workers' compensation system to bar workers from challenging the moral 
legitimacy of capital through the fault system. 
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on claims' experience, also do not, typically, trigger an inquiry into the causes of 
lost-time injuries or fatalities.47 
The tort system is attractive to some because it involves fault-finding and 
because exemplary and non-pecuniary damages can be awarded. That is, it is 
seen as a vehicle through which wrongdoers can be labelled and held fully 
financially accountable for their actions.48 In Canada. however, exemplary 
damages are extremely rare and damages for pain and suffering have been 
capped.49 Moreover, in Nova Scotia and other Canadian jurisdictions, workers' 
compensation is the exclusive remedy and civil actions against the victim's 
employer, co-workers and most other employers in the province are barred by 
statute. 50 Assuming that a way can be found around this obstacle, would a civil 
action help reveal and condemn the underlying causes of the Westray disaster? 
Historically, the tort system has not responded favourably to injured 
workers' claims for compensation from their employers. The strong support of 
mid-19th-century courts for private enterprise and laissez-faire ideology 
manifested itself in the creation of a trilogy of employer defences that effectively 
shielded them from liability.51 By the end of the century, however, some 
legislatures narrowed the scope of employer defences and some judges adopted 
those changes even when not required to do so by statute. For example, in Grant 
v. Acadia Coal Company, 52 a case arising from a gas explosion which killed a 
miner in Pictou County, the Supreme Court of Canada held that a company 
could be liable for injuries arising out of the failure to maintain the mine in a 
safe condition, notwithstanding that competent officials had been hired to 
operate the mine safely but had failed to do so. This decision, in conjunction 
47. Although Nova Scotia Jaw allows for "merit rating," no scheme has been 
established. In any event, there is little evidence that these incentives induce 
employers to improve significantly their health and safety performance. See 
P. Lanoie, "Government Intervention in Occupational Safety: Lessons from the 
American and Canadian Experience" ( 1992) 18 Can. Pub. Pol. 62 at 66-67. 
48. For example, A. Bale, "The American Compensation Phenomenon" ( 1990) 20 
International Journal of Health Services 253 and L. West, "The Employer's 
Intentional Tort: Should it Be Recognized in Canadian Jurisdictions?" (1990) 13 
Dalhousie L.J. 594. · 
49. See Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Exemplary Damages (Toronto, 
1991) at 22-24 and S. M. Waddams, The Law of Damages, 2d ed. (Toronto: 
Canada Law Book, 1991) para.3.510-3.700. 
50. Workers' Compensation Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 508. Actions against out-of-
province manufacturers of equipment used in the mine are not barred. 
51. The courts created a legal presumption that workers voluntarily assumed the risk of 
injury from hazards present in the workplace, including the negligence of co-
workers. Contributory negligence on the part of the victim also constituted a full · 
bar to recovery. E. Tucker, "The Law of Employers' Liability in Ontario, 1861-
1900: The Search for a Theory" (1984) 22 Osgoode Hall L. J. 216. 
52. (1902), 32 S.C.R. 427. 
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with other legal changes, made it possible to use the tort system to scrutinize the 
safety of the employer's system of operation. If a worker could prove the 
employer failed to provide a reasonably safe system of working and that that 
. failure caused her or his injury, the employer could be made to pay. 
The systemic causes of dangerous working conditions were rarely 
considered relevant in such an inquiry. Injured workers were most likely to 
recover where they could prove that the conditions at work were below those 
prevailing in the industry or in violation of the law. Only where this was not true 
would a worker try to establish that the defendant employer's conduct was a 
manifestation of a larger phenomenon, and that the industry standard should be 
judged unacceptable. While courts occasionally do condemn widespread 
employer practices, they are reluctant to do so. In any event, the primary 
question in a tort action is whether unacceptably dangerous conditions caused 
the harm. The underlying reasons why those conditions arose is of secondary 
importance. 
Two arguments have been offered to explain how tort litigation can disclose 
the systemic nature of the problem of unsafe and unhealthy working conditions 
and lead to fundamental reforms. The first is that tort actions have educational 
and ideological impacts. If many injured workers individually prove that their 
particular employers were negligent, then workers and their communities might 
conclude that the problem of unsafe working conditions was systemic and that it 
was the fault of capitalism or of employers as a class. 53 The second argument 
points to a material effect of tort liablity: general deterrence. As damage awards 
pile up, the cost of taking workers' lives and health increases and employers will 
take steps to improve working conditions in order to reduce their legal exposure. 
Both arguments are problematic. Although Bale argues that litigation had a 
delegitimating effect in the United States at the tum of the century, his evidence 
is not entirely persuasive. One of the problems with successful claims is that 
they are just as likely to legitimate the system as to delegitimate it. After all, 
they demonstrate that the system worked; it provided a remedy. Indeed, more 
antagonism and delegitimation seems to have been generated by the failure of 
the tort system to adequately compensate injured workers and their families than 
by its success in showing the employing class to be at fault. This was because 
proving fault and causation in individual cases remained extremely problematic, 
even under a reformed common law regime. Most cases were settled for small 
sums, with no official findings being made and no publicity.54 This result 
53. This is the argument of Bale, supra note 46. 
54. Indeed, some settlements require the plaintiffs lawyers not to disclose damaging 
evidence that had been gathered and not to take further cases. For examples, see M. 
Cherniak, The Hawk's Nest Incident (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986) at 
65-66, 72-73; P. Brodeur, Outrageous Misconduct (New York: Pantheon, 1985) at 
91-92. 
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delegitimated the courts more than it did the unsafe systems of production. 
Contrary to Bale, it is arguable that not only is no-fault workers' compensation 
better at replacing the lost income of injured workers, but that it more clearly 
reveals work-related disability to be a systemic problem in an industrial 
capitalist society; workers recover lost wages without proof of fault and 
employers' collectively pay the cost of compensation claims.55 
An additional problem with the delegitimation thesis is the implicit claim 
that litigation strategies can readily be linked with mobilization strategies.56 The 
current asbestos litigation in the United States raises the problematic nature of 
this claim. Even though joined in "class actions," workers are not mobilized to 
act after a claim is filed. Workers cede control to lawyers and judges and await 
the outcome of legal processes. If the claim succeeds, mobilization around 
health and safety issues is unlikely to follow because the system provided a 
remedy (money for health). It is the failure of the claim that is likely to stimulate 
political action, but valuable time, energy and resources will have been lost, and 
the object of the struggle is more likely to be compensation than prevention. 
The general deterrence effect of tort liability system also is exaggerated. 
Although the value of employer liability claims was rising steadily in several 
jurisdictions in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, individual incentives to 
care were diluted as employers insured themselves against this risk. Indeed, the 
shift to workers' compensation schemes may have increased economic 
incentives for employers to reduce risks because it caused total compensation 
costs to increase. 57 Moreover, when faced with the possibility of large damage 
55. Admittedly, there is nothing inherently "anti-capitalist" in this, but workers' 
compensation was an early step toward the creation of social insurance and a 
welfare state. 
56. For a thoughtful discussion on this point, see M. W. McCann & H. Silverstein, 
"Social Movements and the American State: Legal Mobilization as a Strategy for 
Democratization" in G. Albo et al., eds., A Different Kind of State? Popular Power 
and Democratic Administration (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1993) 131. 
57. On the rising cost, see Bale, supra note 46 at 38-41 and R. C. B. Risk, '"This 
Nuisance of Litigation': The Origins of Workers' Compensation in Ontario" in 
D. Flaherty, ed., Essays in the History of Canadian Law, vol. 1 (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1983) 418 at 435. On the incentive effects of the shift 
to workers' compensation, see D. Brody, Steelworkers in America (New York: 
Harper, 1960) at 167-68 and Graebner, supra note 14. Also see D. Dewees & 
M. Trebilcock, "The Efficacy of the Tort System and its Alternatives: A Review of 
Empirical Evidence" (1992) 30 Osgoode Hall L.J. 57. They conclude (at 131) that 
workers' compensation has had stronger deterrent effects than tort liability. Of 
course, the relative cost of employer liability and workers' compensation systems 
depends on how each are structured. It may be that, in the United States, employers · 
have been more successful at holding down benefit levels and limiting recognition 
of claims in workers' compensation systems than their Canadian counterparts, and 
that American courts have been more generous to injured workers than Canadian 
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claims, corporations have exhibited great ingenuity in limiting their financial 
exposure by hiving off hazardous operations, stripping assets or by declaring 
bankruptcy. Again, the American asbestos litigation is instructive. The corporate 
form makes it difficult to achieve the goals of corrective justice or deterrence. 58 
A tort action against the government of Nova Scotia for negligent inspection 
and regulation of the Westray mine raises some interesting possibilities. 
Decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada in the mid- I 980s established that 
public authorities may be sued for negligently discharging their operational 
duties. None of these cases involved occupational health and safety officials but 
the principles developed in those cases would apply to them, unless thay are 
given statutory immunity.59 To succeed, a plaintiff must show that the authority 
was negligent, that the negligence caused the harm, and that the harm was a 
reasonably foreseeable ·consequence of the misconduct. 60 
It would not be difficult to establish that fatal injuries to workers are a 
reasonably foreseeable consequence of negligently enforcing occupational 
health and safety laws. Workers are, after all, the intended beneficiaries of the 
law. The causation requirement could be satisfied by showing that the harm was 
caused by unlawful conditions. The more difficult legal issues relate to the 
standard of inspection applicable to the defendants and the policy/operation 
distinction. Obviously, a determination will depend on the facts of the case. 
Operational negligence in respect of the Westray mine might be found, for 
example, in not properly following up orders in respect of coal dust. Indeed, the 
Coopers & Lybrand review found serious deficiencies in this aspect of the 
department's work. 61 Yet, given the widespread practice of gentle persuasion in 
courts. The treatment of silicosis-related diseases by American workers' 
compensation boards and courts in the 1930s is suggestive, but neither American 
courts nor compensation systems were very generous. See D. Rosner & 
G. Markowitz, Deadly Dust (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991) at 78-86 
l\nd 91-96; Chemiak, supra note 54 at 52-73. 
58. See H. Hansmann & R. Kraakman, "Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for 
Corporate Torts" (1991) 100 Yale Law Journal 1879 at 1885 and M. J. Roe, 
"Corporate Strategic Reaction to Mass Tort" (1986) 72 Virginia Law Review I. For 
a more extended critique of tort litigation from which I have drawn freely, see 
H.J. Glasbeek, "Outrage Is Not Enough" (1987) 7 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 209. 
59. For example, City of Kamloops v. Nielsen (1984), IO D.L.R. (4th) 641 (S.C.C.) 
[thereinafter City of Kam/oops]. In some jurisdictions, occupational health and 
safety officials are given statutory immunity from negligence actions in respect of 
the good faith execution of their duties. This immunity would also extend to the 
crown. For example. in Ontario see Occupational Health and Safety Act, R.S.O. 
1990, c. 0.1, s. 65. There is no equivalent provision in Nova Scotia. 
60. For an overview, see K. M. Woodall, "Private Law Liability of Public Authorities 
for Negligent Inspection and Regulation" (1992) 37 McGill L.J. 83. 
61. In City of Kam/oops, supra note 59, the failure to enforce a stop-work order issued 
by a building inspector was found to constitute negligence. 
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health and safety enforcement, a court might be hesitant to conclude that this 
behaviour was negligent. 
This brings us to the policy/operation distinction. Courts have taken the 
view that it would be improper to hold governments liable in negligence for 
bona fide policy decisions. The distinction, however, can be easily manipulated. 
The Supreme Court's latest judgments stipulate that decisions which involve or 
are dictated by financial, economic, social or political factors or constraints Will 
be classified as policy decisions.62 If it was the policy of the government not to 
enforce orders vigorously because under the scheme primary responsibility for 
achieving compliance was assigned to the workplace parties, a court will not 
likely find the government liable, even if the policy was naive or misconceived 
and could be said to have caused the loss. A similar result could be expected if a 
policy of gentle persuasion or infrequent inspections was justified on the ground 
that limited resources did not allow closer monitoring. Recall that the i':lternal 
review of the inspectors' activities found them to be within accepted practices.63 
Sadly, the review may be right. The ironic (or, perhaps, intended) result is that 
the more systemic the problem, the less likely it will be that a court will 
condemn it as wrongful. This is not because policy decisions and systemic 
conditions are not causal, but because the court has decided not to extend 
liability for legal, political and institutional reasons. 
Crime 
Criminal prosecution, like tort liability, is a means of holding wrongdoers 
accountable and, potentially, of promoting systemic changes because of its 
ideological and material effects. Unlike tort liability, criminal law is a public 
means of redress rather than a private one. Notionally, society as a whole has 
been harmed, not just the immediate victim and, because of the seriousness of 
the misconduct, the offender is to be punished and stigmatized. 
Harry Glasbeek has made the strongest case for criminal prosecution of 
employers in the occupational health and safety context.64 To greatly 
oversimplify, he argues that prosecutions demonstrate society's intolerance of 
employers who seek to profit by knowingly or recklessly exposing workers to 
62. For example, in the two most recent Supreme Court of Canda decisions in this area, 
Brown v. British Columbia (Minister of Transportation and Highways), [1994] 1 
S.C.R. 420 and Swinamer v. Nova Scotia (A.G.), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 445, the plaintiffs 
lost because the court found that policy, not operational negligence, was the subject 
of the complaint. 
63. Supra note 5. 
64. H.J. Glasbeek, "A Role for Criminal Sanctions in Occupational Health and Safety" 
in New Developments in Employment Law: Meredith Memorial Lectures 
(Montreal: Yvon Blais, 1989) 125. 
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hazardous conditions. Prosecutions also challenge employer claims that the 
hazards they created were natural and unavoidable, or that workers consented to 
the risk of being harmed by them. Thus, in addition to having specific and 
general deterence effects, prosecutions can change popular conceptions which 
might also spur regulatory authorities to treat hazardous working conditions 
more seriously, leading to stricter standards and more enforcement. 
Despite its appeal, the criminalization strategy faces enormous hurdles. 
First, criminal law does not stand in an external relation to society; it is a product 
of and an instrument for maintaining unequal social relations, and a ground of 
struggle.65 This becomes manifest when distinctions are made between those 
activities that warrant criminal prosecution and those that are to be remedied, if 
at all, through civil litigation. Nowhere is this more true than in respect of killing 
and injuring at work. For example, in the 19th century, railway workers were 
frequently prosecuted because, railway officials claimed, worker negligence or 
breaches of operating procedures were the principal cause of fatal injuries to 
passengers, pedestrians and co-workers. Juries, however, were sceptical and 
frequently did not convict workers charged in these circumstances. In contrast, 
employers were rarely prosecuted even though deaths and injuries could be 
attributed to unsafe systems of operation they had created. Moreover, employers 
were generally able to avoid trials or convictions through various legal 
maneuvers.66 
This asymmetrical treatment of misconduct by workers and employers was 
also reproduced in the legislative arena. Attempts to have the federal 
government enact factory legislation pursuant to its criminal law power were 
rebuffed by other parliamentarians on jurisdictional grounds; the protection of 
workers' lives and health was said to be a matter of property and civil rights 
within provincial jurisdiction. Employer conduct endangering the lives and 
health of workers was not seen to fall within the class of "those wrongs 
committed against society which are themselves bad, and which are prosecuted 
and punished in the name of the Sovereign."67 
In the 20th century, occupational health and safety-related criminal 
prosecutions of workers68 and employers are exceedingly rare and convictions 
65. G. Slapper, "Corporate Manslaughter: An Examination of the Determinants of 
Prosecutorial Policy" (1993) 2 Social and Legal Studies 423 at 436--41 and L. 
Snider, "Feminism, Punishment and the Potential of Empowerment" (1994) 9: I 
C.J.L.S. 75 at 78-85. 
66. For a summary and references to other sources, see Tucker. Administering Danger 
in the Workplace, supra note 13 at 66-75. 
67. Canada, House of Commons, Debates (21 May 1888) at 883 (David Mills). 
68. For example, see R. v. Baker, [1929] S.C.R. 354, affg. (1928), 63 O.L.R. 275 
(C.A.) which quashed the conviction of a hoistman employed by Inco Ltd. for 
criminal negligence. Nearly 60 years later, another Inco worker was charged with 
criminal negligence. He was acquitted at trial. See R. v. Kuhle (1990), 3 C.O.H.S.C. 
113 
CJLS/RCDS Vol. 10#1(Springlprintemps1995) 
almost impossible to obtain. Research to date has uncovered only eight criminal 
prosecutions of employers in Canada this century and one conviction that 
withstood appeal. A corporation convicted of manslaughter in respect of a 
methane gas explosion that killed 29 coal miners was fined $5000. The most 
common reason for acquittals was that the Crown failed to prove that the 
employers' conduct was so wanton and reckless that it should be branded as 
criminaI.69 In short, the dominant occupational health and safety ideology shapes 
the response of the criminal justice system. 70 
53 (Ont. Prov. Ct.) and M. Lowe, "Wanton and Reckless Disregard? The Case of 
Joseph Kuhle" (1988) 10:6 At the Centre 14. 
69. For an egregious instance of government failing to lay charges even after a 
coroner's jury found employer negligence in the death of 21 coal miners in 1910, 
see D. J. Bercuson, "Tragedy at Bellevue: Anatomy of a Mine Disaster" (1978) 3 
Labour/Le Travailleur 221. For the unsuccesful prosecutions, see: R. v, Great 
Western Laundry Co. (1900), 13 Man. R. 66 (K.B.) (held that an indictment does 
not lie against a corporation for manslaughter since it could not be punished; this 
position was doubted by the Supreme Court of Canada in Union Colliery Co. v. R. 
(1900), 31 S.C.R. 81); Rex v. Canadian Allis-Chambers Ltd. (1923), 54 O.L.R. 38 
(C.A.) (conviction quashed on the basis that no evidence upon which conviction 
could be sustained); R. v. Canadian Liquid Air Ltd. (1973), 20 C.R.N.S. 208 
(B.C.S.C) (at close of prosecution's case, jury directed to bring in a verdict of not 
guilty on charge of criminal negligence); R. v. International Paper Co. (1979), 50 
C.C.C. (2d) 231 (Que. C.A.) (manslaughter conviction overturned on grounds that 
the prosecution failed to prove wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of 
others); R. v. Noranda Mines Ltd. (January 1983), (Ont.Prov. Ct.) [unreported] 
referred to in Lowe, ibid. (criminal negligence causing death charge dismissed for 
lack of evidence of wanton and reckless disregard); R. v. Syncrude Canada Ltd. 
(1983), 48 A.R. 368 (Q.B.) (acquitted because no reckless disregard for safety of 
workers; Quebec (A.G.) v. Be/moral Mines Ltee, [ 1989] 1 S.C.R. 422 (case arose 
out of a cave-in at a mine in Val D'Or, Quebec that killed eight miners). At trial, 
held six years after the event, the corporation was acquitted. On appeal, a new trial 
was ordered and the Supreme Court of Canada upheld that decision. Despite this, 
charges were dropped in 1990 because the company had agreed to pay $25,000 
compensation to each victim's family and because the prosecutor could see no 
useful purpose in pursuing the case ten years after the event.) B. McKenna & P. 
Poirier, "Charges Dropped Against Mining Firm" The [Toronto] Globe & Mail (2 
February 1990) A I. The only successful prosecution was brought against Brazeau 
Collieries. An explosion at its Nordegg mine on 31 October 1941 killed 29 
workers. As in Westray, the defendants brought a motion to quash the charge 
because it lacked particulars. The motion was dismissed. See Rex v. Brazeau 
Collieries Ltd. (1942), 3 W.W.R. 570. A conviction was obtained for criminal 
negligence based on evidence indicating frequent occurrences of high levels of 
methane gas in the mine before the explosion. Despite complaints by the miners 
and their union, precautions had not been taken. Chief Justice Ives explained that 
he did not impose a substantial penalty because of the close and friendly 
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The legal process itself creates further impediments to the successful use of 
the criminal law. The prosecution must prove all elements of the offence beyond 
a reasonable doubt. The rights of persons suspected of or charged with criminal 
offences limit state authorities in gathering and presenting evidence. Accused 
persons who are sophisticated and can afford experienced legal counsel are able 
to ensure that their rights are scrupulously respected throughout the process. 
Thus, in the Curragh prosecution, the first set of charges was quashed on the 
ground that they failed to describe the events giving rise to the alleged offences 
with sufficient particularity.71 Items seized under a search warrant had to be 
returned because the Crown failed to apply to retain them within the time limit.72 
During the trial, evidence has been excluded because of irregularities and a 
motion has been brought to stay the proceeding because of an alleged 
withholding of evidence. Finally, additional problems arise when the accused is 
a corporation. 73 
The legal process also discourages inquiries into the systemic factors that 
produce the behaviour which is the subject of the prosecution. Attention will be 
directed to the ·most immediate events (thereby separating them from their social 
context) and the actions of particular individuals. Indeed, it may be difficult to 
persuade the court to consider evidence of systemic problems in the workplace, 
let alone their systemic causes. The processes of decontextualization and 
individualization are driven by the need of prosecutors to focus the court's 
attention on the elements of the criminal offence the law requires them to prove, 
as well as by the ideological commitments of judges who are unlikely to 
association between mine officials, pit bosses, fire bosses and miners. "Outside of 
the mine conditions. the company ... acted in the interests of the men". "Nasdegg 
Mine is Fined $5,000", Calgary Herald, (18 (?)January 1943). I am indebted to 
Dean Jobb for bnnging this conviction to my attention. 
70. Ideology also influences the conduct of police investigations. D. Bergman, Deaths 
at Work: Accidents or Corporate Crime? (London: WEA, 1991) at 12-18. At 
Westray, for instance, the police failed to take timely steps to obtain search 
warrants and secure evidence, presumably because they assumed, initially, that no 
crime was committed. See Cameron & Mitrovica, supra note 1 at 59-60. 
71. A second set of charges was laid, and their validity was upheld when challenged. 
Supra note 3. 
72. R. v. Curragh Inc. (1994), 126 N.S.R.(2d) 159 (S. Ct.); "Westray Judge Agrees to 
Strike 'Edited' Safety Report, Testimony" [Halifax] Daily News (25 April 1995); 
and "Westray Trial Hits New Snag", supra note 3. 
73. This is not the place to elaborate upon these difficulties. The literature is vast. For a 
good beginning, see C. Wells, Corporations and Criminal Responsibility (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1993) and H.J. Glasbeek, "Why Corporate Deviance is Not 
Treated as a Crime: The Need to Make Profits a Dirty Word" (1984) 22 Osgoode 
Hall L.J. 394. 
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sympathize with attempts to condemn as criminal conduct what they see as 
socially beneficial. 14 
In sum, although employers can be successfully prosecuted in some 
circumstances,75 their material and ideological effects of criminal prosecutions 
are limited beause of the prevalence of the very attitudes that criminalization 
strategies aim to change and the limitations of the criminal justice system. 
Because criminal prosecutions are likely to succeed only in cases of egregious 
misconduct, the "normal" business (mis)conduct that is responsible for the 
overwhelming majority of injuries and diseases is unlikely to be delegitimized, 
and the systemic causes of this behaviour are unlikely to be named or blamed.76 
Public Inquiries 
The mandate of public inquiries into disasters is much broader than crim"inal or 
civil courts because they do not make legal determinations of fault or guilt. 
Legal conceptions of causation that narrow the parameters of what is properly 
before a court do not apply in an open-ended examination of "what went 
wrong." Thus, there is no legal barrier to the inquiry entertaining the claims that 
socio-economic conditions create an environment conducive to bad occupational 
health and safety practices and that unsafe practices are widespread. Rules 
limiting the admissibility of similar fact evidence and other legal conceptions 
that promote decontextualization and individualization of causation are less 
important in this forum. 
74. This last point is made particularly well by R. Johnstone, "The Legal Construction 
of Occupational Health and Safety Offences in Victoria: 1983-1991" in R. 
Johnstone, ed., Occupational Health & Safety Prosecutions in Australia, 
Occasional Monograph Series No. I, (Melbourne: Centre for Employment and 
Labour Relations Law, 1994) 78. 
75. The criminal law has been used most successfully in the United States. M. Bixby, 
"Workplace Homicide: Trends, Issues and Policy" (1991) 70 Oregon Law Review 
333. There was also a recent conviction of an employer for manslaughter in 
Australia. R. v. Denbo Pty Ltd .. (14 June 1994) (Sup. Ct. of Victoria) [unreported] 
See Johnstone, ibid. 
76. I have not considered the role of prosecutions for regulatory offences even though 
this is the most common way that employers are legally sanctioned in Canada. 
There is a debate over the relative merit of regulatory and criminal prosecutions. 
There is Jess stigma associated with conviction for a regulatory offence. The 
advantages of regulatory prosecutions are that there are likely to be more of them 
and a greater percentage will succeed. See K. Webb, "Controlling Corporate 
Misconduct through Regulatory Offences: The Canadian Legal Experience" in· 
Pearce & Snider, eds., supra note 33 [forthcoming]; K. Carson & R. Johnstone, 
"The Dupes of Hazard: Occupational Health and Safety and the Victorian 
Sanctions Debate" (1990) 26 Australia-New Zealand Journal of Sociology 126. 
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In the case of the Westray inquiry, the Order-in-Council's terms of reference 
are broad indeed, and include a general authority to inquire into "all other 
matters related to the establishment and operation of the Mine which the 
Commissioner considers relevant to the occurrence." This could involve 
examination of the failure to consider health and safety as an independent 
concern in the decision to mine, the enforcement practices of the mine inspectors 
and the Occupational Health and Safety Division of the Department of Labour, 
and the dangerous production decisions of Curragh. 
Yet, the tragic cycle of disasters, public inquiries, recommendations and 
more disasters warns us that, despite its greater possibilities, other factors 
operate to limit the effectiveness of inquiries.77 Although generally good at 
identifying the immediate technical causes of disasters, the treatment of systemic 
causes of occupational health and safety disasters by inquiries has been much 
less consistent. In some, only the most immediate causes are considered. 
Examples include: the 1914 inquiry into the explosion at the Hillcrest coal mine 
in Alberta that killed 189 miners; the 1935 inquiry into the explosion at the 
Imperial mine in Coalhurst, Alberta that killed 16 miners; the 1956 royal 
commission on the explosion at the No. 4 coal mine in Spring Hill, Nova Scotia 
that killed 39 miners; the 1958 inquiry into the "bump" at the No. 2 coal mine in 
Spring Hill, Nova Scotia that killed 78 miners and the 1980 inquiry into the 
cave-in at the Reiff Terrace Mine at Grande Cache, Alberta that killed four 
miners. 78 
77. In one of the first inquiries into an industrial-type disaster in Canada, 
commissioners found that the Great Western Railway had put its trains into 
operation, over the objection of its chief engineer, before the track was adequately 
secured and proper systems of management in place. The major recommendation, 
however, was that workers should be made criminally responsible for breaches of 
the railway's operating procedures. Despite this and numerous other inquiries into 
railway hazards, employment on the railways remained one of the most dangerous 
occupations in Canada. See P. Craven, "The Meaning of Misadventure: The 
Baptiste Creek Railway Disaster of 1854 and its Aftermath" in R. Hall et al., eds., 
Patterns of the Past (Toronto: Dundum Press, 1988) 108. 
78. Alberta, Report of the Commission appointed for the Investigation and Enquiry into 
the Cause and Effect of the Hillcrest Mine Disaster in Alberta, Department of 
Public Works, Mines Branch, Annual Report, 1914, (Edmonton: J. W. Jeffrey, 
Government Printer, 1915) at 161-69; Alberta, Report of an inquiry into the cause 
of the explosion the 9th day of December, 1935 in a coal mine known as the 
"Imperial Mine" operated by the Lethbridge Collieries Limited, (Calgary: [s.n.], 
1936); Nova Scotia, Report of the Royal Commission Appointed to Inquire into the 
Explosion and Fire in the No. 4 Mine at Springhi/l, N.S. on the 1st Day of 
November, 1956 (Halifax: Queen's Printer, 1957); Nova Scotia, Report of the Royal 
Commission Appointed to inquire into he Upheaval or Fall or other Disturbance 
sometimes referred to as a Bump in No. 2 Mine at Springhill, in the County of 
Cumberland operated by Cumberland Railway and Coal Company, on the 23rd of 
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Other inquiries have considered broader questions of causation, but handled 
them badly. For example, when the Royal Commission on the Ocean Ranger 
disaster turned its mind to the question of why the workers were not as well 
protected as they could have been, its answer was "economics." "In the real 
world, some measure of safety must be surrendered, some degree of risk 
accepted, if an economical and useful drilling unit is to be constructed."79 But 
how was acceptable risk to be determined? The Commission rejected the idea of 
leaving it up to market forces entirely, but seemed to stumble badly in 
formulating an alternative. Acceptable risk was defined as what is "acceptable to 
society and capable of being tolerated by those directly involved."80 While 
acknowledging that risk perceptions were socially constructed, the report failed 
to consider that inequality between workers desperate for jobs and large multi-
national companies might shape workers' willingness to accept hazardous 
conditions and employers' level of commitment to providing safety. One critical 
commentator noted, "this final Report has not seen fit to grapple adequately with 
this broader context which could all too easily turn out to be the context for 
further disasters."81 
Still other inquiries have exhibited somewhat greater sensitivity to these 
issues. The Royal Commission into the Hinton train collision. for example, 
emphasized the role of the culture of risk-taking that pervaded railway 
operations and led to collusion between management and workers in the 
violation of safety rules. It also recognized, however, that the work scheduling 
and pay systems created incentives for workers to engage in risky behaviour.82 
The Beaudry Commission into the 1980 Belmoral mine disaster in Quebec also 
drew attention to the negative role of production bonuses in mine safety. 
However, the report denied that there was any real conflict between worker 
safety and profit-maximizing behaviour by employers. Indeed, its conclusion 
October, 1958, (Halifax: Province of Nova Scotia, 1959); Alberta, Coal Mine 
Safety Board of Inquiry, Final Report, vol. 1, (Edmonton: Workers' Health, Safety 
and Compensation, 1981) (Commissioner: H. G. Stephenson). For a discussion of 
the underlying causes of the 1958 "bump" and the failure of the inquiry to consider 
them, see I. McKay, "Springhill 1958" (1983-1984) 4:2 New Maritimes 4. For a 
discussion of the Stephenson inquiry and particularly of its failure to censure local 
mine officials, including Gerald Phillips who was underground manager in the year 
leading up to the cave-in at the Reiff Terrace mine, see Jobb, supra note 2 at 113-
15. 
79. Canada, Royal Commission on the Ocean Ranger Marine Disaster, Report Two: 
Safety Offshore Eastern Canada (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply and Services, 1985) 
at 15. 
80. Ibid. at 14. 
81. W. G. Carson, "Learning from Experience" (1985) 8:4 At the Centre 7 at 9. 
82. Canada, Commission of Inquiry: Hinton Train Collision (Ottawa: Ministry of 
Supply and Services, 1986) [hereinafter Hinton Commission]. 
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was that "safety paid" and that, with experience (and some government and 
union prodding), mine managers would learn this. 83 
Rarely do inquiries consider inequality and conflict between workers and 
employers to be causally relevant. Those that do stand out.The inquiry into the 
194 l explosion at the Brazeau Colliery in Nordegg, Alberta was one such 
inquiry. Having found that, "there was on the part of all the officials actively 
engaged in the operation of the mine a general disregard of the safety provisions 
of The Mines Act and a general indifference to, and contempt for the dangers 
incident to gas accumulations in the mine,"84 the commissioner, A. F. Ewing, 
considered why this attitude had developed. Although not fully spelled out, the 
report noted that the apparent willingness of workers to accept this state of 
affairs was conditioned by their Jack of authority over, and inability to obtain 
information possessed by, management. The report also pointed to the harassing 
effect of pressures exerted on low level mine officials (fire bosses) by more 
senior ones for whom safety was secondary to output. The report recommended 
that fire bosses be appointed by the state to put them beyond the control of mine 
operators. 
Perhaps the inquiry that went furthest in considering socio-economic 
conditions as an underlying cause was the one conducted by R.H. Elfstrom into 
an explosion at the Cape Breton coal mine that killed 12 miners in 1979. 
Elfstrom found that "[t]he social and industrial expectations and acceptance of 
unnecessary risks over many years against the possible Joss of employment had 
fostered attitudes and environmental conditions that made this explosion and 
previous fires almost inevitable."85 Further, he found that the "[p]roduction of 
coal was given a priority over almost all other considerations."86 This resulted in 
a variety of unsafe and, in some cases, unlawful practices to which workers 
83. A number of other inquiries during this period operated from the same premise. 
These included the Ham Commission and the Burkett Inquiry, both of which 
promoted the creation and development of an internal responsibility system for 
regulating health and safety in which workers would have a consultative role. 
Ontario, Report of the Royal Commission on the Health and Safety of Workers in 
Mines (Toronto: Ministry of the Attorney General, 1976) (Commissioner: James 
M. Ham) ; Canada, Towards Safe Production: The Report of The Joint Federal-
Provincial Inquiry of Commission into Safety in Mines and Mining Plants in 
Ontario (Toronto: Joint Federal-Provincial Inquiry Commission into Safety in 
Mines and Mining Plants in Ontario, 1981) (Commissioner: Kevin M. Burkett). 
84. Alberta, Report of an Enquiry into a Disaster whereby twenty-nine men lost their 
lives on October 31. 1941, in a coal mine known as Number 3 Mine, owned & 
operated by Brazeau Collieries Limited, at Nordegg, Alberta (Edmonton: [s.n.], 
1941) at 21. 
85. Canada, Report of Commission of Inquiry, Explosion in No. 26 Colliery Glace Bay, 
Nova Scotia on February 24, 1979 (Ottawa: 1979), (Commissioner: R.H. 
Elfstrom) at ix-x [hereinafter Elfstrom Report]. 
86. Ibid. at 32. 
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acceded out of fear of job loss or retaliation by the employer if they complained 
to mine inspectors. 
Elfstrom also found that the regulations were not consistently applied nor 
comprehensively enforced. Mine inspectors never stopped production because of 
high methane concentrations or the continued presence of correctable ignition 
problems. The relations of the inspectors with union representatives were formal 
at best. Harmonious relations, however, were maintained with the corporation 
despite the difficulties the chief inspector experienced in enforcing directives. In 
part, this was attributed to personal loyalties and associations and "other social 
pressures brought about by residing in the coal mining community ."87 These 
findings, unlike those arising from the Ocean Ranger, begin to recognize the 
illusory nature of "consent" in an economic context where workers have few 
choices. Although the recommendations did not challenge this broader context, 
stronger enforcement and more worker participation were suggested. 
Liora Salter has noted the contradiction between the radical potential of 
inquiries and their disappointingly limited results. 88 Inquiries into health and 
safety disasters confirm this observation. What are its causes? The 
commissioners themselves often may share many of the same assumptions that 
are held by private entrepreneurs and government officials. Aside from the sheer 
pervasiveness of these views, commissioners are often selected because they are 
seen as "sound." Moreover, as Salter notes, there is an implicit understanding 
that the inquiry is to produce a report and recommendations that the government 
of the day will find acceptable. This promotes self-censorship and the 
dominance of narrow pragmatism. 
Occasionally, these tendencies are counterbalanced, but we need more 
detailed studies of health and safety inquiries to understand how and why this 
happens. In addition to the presence of particularly strong-minded and 
independent commissioners, another important factor may be the ability of 
groups to mobilize their members, influence public opinion and exert pressure 
on the commissioners. 
Even if favourable recommendations are made, the government may not act 
on them. For example, the Hinton train collision inquiry report noted that no 
action had been taken in response to an earlier report mad.e by the Gallagher 
Inquiry in 1972 calling for changes in work scheduling and pay systems. 
87. Ibid. at xi, xiii, 17-18, 36-38. 
88. L. Salter, "The Two Contradictions in Public Inquiries" in A. P. Ross et al., eds., 
Commissions of Inquiry (Toronto: Carswell, 1990) 174. For more positive 
assessments of the radical potential of royal commissions, see J. Jenson, 
"Commissioning Ideas: Representation and Royal Commissions" in S. D. Phillips, 
ed., How Ottawa Spends 1994-95: Making Change (Ottawa: Carleton University· 
Press, 1994) 39; N. Bradford, "Ideas, Institutions and Innovation: Economic Policy 
in Canada and Sweden" in S. Brooks & A.-G. Gagnon, eds., The Political Influence 
of Ideas (Westport: Praeger, 1994) 83. 
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Similarly, Elfstrom noted that most of the conditions and practices that led to the 
1979 explosion had been identified as problems by commissions of inquiry in 
1974 and 1975.89 Other examples of political inaction abound.90 A study of the 
history of American coal mining legislation shows that safety laws were not 
enacted simply in response to major disasters; economic conditions favourable 
to workers also had to be present before political action would be taken. 91 This 
helps explain why health and safety reforms were enacted in Ontario following 
the Ham Commission report. The commission itself was appointed as a response 
to growing worker militancy over health and safety in the mid-1970s. Uranium 
miners in Northern Ontario were particularly active, buoyed by the increased 
demand for uranium that provided them with a degree of security they had not 
enjoyed in nearly two decades. That militancy continued, both inside and at the 
margins of the official labour movement, and received the strong support of the 
Ontario NDP. 92 
Conclusion 
The arguments presented here can be summarized briefly. Debates about the 
causation of occupational health and safety disasters are densely political 
because they are driven instrumentally and because causation analysis is, almost 
invariably, informed by assumptions arising from and about the social context in 
which the disaster occurred. More specifically, assumptions about the 
inalterability or desirability of the political economic order are so deeply 
embedded that this context is rarely seen as significantly causal. Instead, 
attention is focussed on the most immediate causes. The resulting approach, 
however, only provides a partial explanation of the causes of most disasters. Any 
attempt to explain the Westray mine disaster that does not accord great 
89. Hinton Commission, supra note 82 at 91-92 and Elfstrom Report, supra note 85 at 
XII. 
90. On the Alberta and British Columbia governments' lack of responsiveness to 
recommendations of coroners' inquiries and special commissions in respect of coal 
mine disasters early this century, see J. A. Green, Calculated Risks: Worker, Owner 
and Government Attitudes Towards Safety in the Crow's Nest Pass Mines, 1900-
1915 (M.A. Thesis. University of Calgary, 1990) [unpublished] at 186-89. 
91 . Curran, supra note I 0 at I 04-08. 
92. The history of this health and safety movement has yet to be written. For a 
beginning. see H. Sequin & A. King, "Some Reflections on the Health and Safety 
struggles of Northern Ontario Miners" (paper presented to the New Solutions 
Conference, 9 September 1994) [unpublished] and B. Walker, "Government 
Regulation of Health Hazards in the Ontario Uranium Mining Industry, 1955-
1976" in M. Bray & A. Thompson, eds., At the End of the Shift (Toronto: Dundum 
Press, 1992) 130. 
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significance to the political-economic environment that shaped the decision to 
mine, the conduct of the mining operations and the state's regulation of those 
operations will be terribly and, perhaps, tragically flawed. 
When major health and safety disasters like Westray occur, it becomes 
possible to make visible and challenge hidden assumptions that inform everyday 
understandings about the causes of accidents and that legitimate a system of 
regulation which regularly permits workers to be exposed to dangerous 
conditions. These assumptions (for example, that workers freely consent to risk, 
that risks are equally shared by workers and employers and that workers 
materially benefit from risk) seem less plausible when workers are killed en 
masse because of persistently dangerous working conditions. The claim that 
capitalist relations of production, and the ideological structure that supports 
them, are a significant cause of unsafe and unhealthy working conditions will be 
strongly resisted in court rooms and before public inquiries, but differences in 
the institutional environments in which the politics of causation are conducted 
can be significant. 
Tort actions (particularly against government for negligent regulation and 
enforcement) and, even more so, criminal charges against individuals (and 
possibly organizations) whose decisions and (in)actions were the immediate 
causes of a disaster, provide opportunities to contest some practices and beliefs. 
However, the legal setting requires that claims or charges be framed in particular 
ways that limit the scope of inquiry and make it difficult to identify systemic 
conditions as legally relevant causes. Nevertheless, criminal prosecutions are 
important to pursue in appropriate cases because of their strong symbolism; they 
condemn some killing and injuring at work as fundamentally anti-social 
conduct, not merely the unfortunate but incidental result of socially useful 
activities, repairable by the payment of compensation to the victims. 
Commissions of inquiry provide even greater opportunities to broaden the public 
debate by putting the systemic causes of disasters onto the agenda. Resistance, 
however, is substantial. 
Clearly, legal strategies alone will never be enough. There are pressures 
operating in each setting that undermine their potential to deter or delegitimate. 
Perhaps the most important political work performed by .mainstream causal 
analysis is to keep at bay approaches to health and safety that demand a radical 
re-examination of fundamental social relations and widely held beliefs. 
Moreover, even if a judge or commissioner does challenge the normalcy or 
acceptability of deeply entrenched practices, social change will not follow 
automatically. The history of health and safety reform provides ample evidence 
that, to achieve even moderate reforms, legal strategies must be linked to 
mobilization strategies. The slogan, "workers' lives can only be saved by the 
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workers themselves"93 captures a basic truth and poses a real challenge to all 
those concerned with the aftermath of Westray. Can engagement with the 
multitude of legal responses to the disaster be used to strengthen a grassroots 
health and safety movement?94 The challenge is a formidable one, as economic 
·restructuring and neo-conservative policies combine to create an increasingly 
insecure environment for the vast majority of workers. 
93. B. Zeluck, "Organizing for Our Lives" (1994) 9: I [new series] Against the Current 
6 at 9. 
94. For some interesting observations on tactics for joining legal and mobilization 
strategies, see McCann & Silverstein. supra note 56 at 140-42. 
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